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Book Review 
Bad Trip: 
Drug Prohibition and the 
Weakness of Public Policy 
America's Longest War: Rethinking Our Tragic Crusade Against Drugs. By 
Steven B. Duke & Albert C. Gross. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1993. 
Pp. xix, 348. $26.95. 
Randy E. Barnettt 
INTRODUCTION 
Popular support for drug prohibition-especially among those who have 
given the matter any thought-is like support for George Bush just after 
Operation Desert Storm: very broad and very thin. Perhaps some personal 
experiences of mine will illustrate why. 
Personal Anecdote Number One: In the early morning hours of February 
24, 1979, Michael Salcedo, his brother Arthur, and their friend Frank Mussa 
decided to buy some marijuana. Because marijuana is illegal, they could not 
go to the same legitimate businesses that sell tobacco or alcohol. So the three 
young men set out for Latin Eagles territory on the north side of Chicago; 
specifically to King Kastle, a hamburger stand that gang members were known 
t Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. My thanks to Alan Feld for his comments on 
an earlier draft and to Saba Khairi for her research assistance. 
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to frequent. When they arrived there, Michael approached gang members Juan 
Caballero, Placedo LaBoy, Nelson Aviles, and Luis Ruiz, and asked if they 
would sell him some marijuana. Ruiz replied truthfully that they had no 
marijuana to sell and did not know where any might be found. Thinking that 
perhaps Ruiz and the others did not trust them, Michael told Ruiz that he knew 
Jose Cortez, a member of the Latin Eagles. Ruiz then asked Michael if he was 
an Eagle. Michael said he was and boasted that he had ridden with the Eagles 
when they went on "hits" against their archrivals, the Latin Kings. 
Had Michael actually been as knowledgeable about gangs as he was 
attempting to demonstrate, he would have been aware of a critical fact: the 
persons with whom he was speaking were members of the Latin Kings, not the 
Latin Eagles. Their response to Michael's braggadocio was to tell him that 
they did have marijuana to sell after all. The gang members then accompanied 
the three young men to their car, and directed them to drive to an alley where 
they would do the deal. Upon arriving in the alley, they instructed Michael to 
accompany them around a corner. After turning the corner, Ruiz revealed their 
deception and the four proceeded to beat Michael until they were "satisfied." 
Ruiz and LaBoy then returned to the car and drove around the corner to pick 
up Michael and the others. 
After driving to another alley, Caballero and LaBoy ordered Michael and 
Frank out of the car, took them at gunpoint to a gangway, and told them to lie 
face down in the snow. Meanwhile, in the car, Aviles stabbed Arthur to death. 
Then, LaBoy led Frank back to the car, pushed him on top of Arthur's body, 
and stabbed him to death. Finally, Caballero forced Michael into the car, 
shoved him on the bodies of his brother and friend, and stabbed him to death. 
Each youths' throat was slit before each was stabbed repeatedly in the chest. 
We learned these chilling facts from the court-reported confession of Juan 
Caballero. As an Assistant State's Attorney, I took both that statement and an 
oral confession from Luis Ruiz.1 After Caballero signed his statement, I asked 
him, "If you had to do it over, would you do it again?" He replied, "If it was 
a sure thing." When I told him that there is no such thing as a sure thing, he 
remarked that "lots of Kings have killed people without getting caught." I 
responded that he got caught, but if he had it to do over, would he do it again? 
He answered, "I'd kill Michael for sure; I don't know about the other two." 
The moral of this story: Drug prohibition kills. There were no actual illicit 
drugs in this story. Drug prohibition "worked" insofar as the members of the 
Latin Kings had no marijuana to sell on that fateful night. Yet three young 
men are dead, because drug prohibition made it impossible for them to buy 
marijuana from a safe and legal supplier, as they might have bought alcohol 
or tobacco. Had the local liquor or drug store sold marijuana, these young men 
I. For a more detailed account of the facts in this case, see People v. Ruiz. 447 N.E.2d 148 (Ill. 1982), 
and People v. Caballero, 464 N.E.2d 223 (III. 1984). 
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would have lived. Perhaps smoking marijuana would have been harmful to 
their health; drug prohibition was fatal. 
Since these three deaths in 1979, prohibition has taken the lives of 
thousands more. As the war on drugs has escalated, so too has the violence. 
When I was a prosecutor, over half of the murders I prosecuted were "drug-
law related" in the sense that the victim was killed as a result of a drug deal 
gone bad or a robbery of someone suspected of having either valuable drugs 
or money from selling drugs. To illustrate the typical drug-prohibition-related 
murder, I might have detailed the story of brothers Robert and George King, 
whom I prosecuted for brutally stabbing Gregory Perkins to death with a pair 
of scissors. Perkins was known to sell marijuana and therefore was believed 
to have a large sum of money in his possession. He did not, but he died 
anyway. 
Personal Anecdote Number Two: In 1976, when I was a law clerk for the 
State's Attorney's Office of Cook County, the average caseload per judge was 
well over 400. In those days, plea bargaining was notorious, leading to such 
travesties as the "Cook County Voluntary," the name used to describe how the 
system typically dealt with the murder of one spouse by the other. Despite 
clear evidence of murder, unless the victim was someone special, such cases 
routinely were pled out as voluntary manslaughters. Rapes routinely were 
reduced to aggravated battery. Car thieves and burglars had to be convicted 
dozens of times before being imprisoned. It simply was not possible to bring 
even a small fraction of cases to trial, and defense lawyers knew it. So most 
cases ended with extremely lenient deals. 
This was just about the time that the federal Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration began to expend federal funds on local law enforcement. One 
of my first tasks as a law clerk assigned to a felony trial court was to select 
the approximately one quarter of the docket that would be assigned to new 
felony trial courts opening up on the West Side. By the time I returned to the 
felony trial courts as an Assistant State's Attorney in 1979, the caseload in 
each courtroom was down to between 125 and 135. This meant that as a 
prosecutor I could credibly threaten to try any case on the call. This, in turn, 
meant that I could offer plea bargains that were in my judgment correct 
sentences. We tried the cases we liked and pled the rest, unaffected by 
caseload concerns. However, that was before the "War on Drugs" really started 
to heat up.2 By the 1990's, the caseload had once again climbed to over 400, 
even though the number of courts had greatly increased. Give-away plea 
2. One of the reasons that Bernard Carey, the State's Attorney for whom I initially worked, was 
defeated in 1980 by Richard M. Daley was Daley's charge that Carey was too "soft" on drug prosecution. 
Indeed, Mr. Carey did have a very lenient approach to first-time possession offenses. 
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bargaining was once again rampant, especially for those accused of property 
crimes.3 
The moral of this story: There is no such thing as a free crime. Every 
enforcement effort consumes scarce resources. The more conduct we define as 
criminal, the more that scarce resources have to be allocated selectively among 
different crimes. The more money and time that is spent enforcing drug 
prohibition, the less that is available to enforce other crimes, to provide 
treatment for drug users, to provide health care, to feed the poor, or to do 
anything else that people may value. Moreover, the inflation of crimes 
diminishes the significance attached to each. As more conduct is criminalized 
in order to "send a message" of societal disapproval, enforcement of each 
crime declines. Consequently, the message actually delivered to prospective 
criminals becomes less meaningful. Criminalizing more conduct has the 
paradoxical effect of making both law-abiding and law-breaking citizens 
breathe easier at night-the former in the short run and the latter in the long 
run. 
Personal Anecdote Number Three: During the time I was a prosecutor, all 
drug cases in Chicago were funneled through two preliminary hearing courts. 
Rumor had it that one of these judges was corrupt; he allegedly disposed of 
drug cases based on payments from favored lawyers. (Eventually, this judge 
was indicted and convicted during the Operation Greylord federal probe of 
local corruption, but not until I had left the prosecutor's office and entered law 
teaching.) As a prosecutor assigned to the courtroom of the honest judge, I was 
advised to beware of police reports in which the circumstances of the arrest 
were ambiguously described. By permitting the reporting officers to testify 
later that they had committed an illegal search, such reports enabled the 
officers to derail unilaterally a prosecution upon receipt of a bribe. 
Finally, in those days, prosecutors assigned to the Felony Review Unit 
were not involved in approving charges or search warrants for drug cases. 
Three reasons were cited for this policy. First, the volume of drug cases would 
have diverted scarce resources away from other more important pursuits. 
Second, the State's Attorney considered prosecuting drug cases to be 
potentially corrupting, and he wanted his prosecutors to be only minimally 
involved in the highly discretionary charging stage of the case. Third, in drug 
cases one typically had only police witnesses. Absent some evidence to the 
contrary, prosecutors would not question police accounts of an arrest or case 
3. This increase eventually was somewhat alleviated by the opening of special drug courts operating 
in the evening hours. Notice, however, that although evening hours would be much more convenient for 
working people, who are often the victims of crime, these new evening courts were created as a result of 
prohibition, rather than out of concern for crime victims. The cases in these after-hours courts are ones in 
which there are no civilian complaining witnesses. 
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and, consequently, there was not much for prosecutors to evaluate. They would 
of necessity simply rubber stamp the police decisions.4 
The moral of this story: Drug prohibition greatly increases official 
corruption. Judges, police officers, and prosecutors are all enforcing laws in 
which there is no civilian complaining witness to provide an external check on 
police, prosecutorial, and judicial discretion. No outsider effectively knows 
what is going on inside the system. Given the vast amount of drug money in 
the black market created by prohibition, there is little to prevent law 
enforcement personnel from pocketing their share, save the extremely rare 
federal probe of local law enforcement.5 And a police officer, prosecutor,6 or 
judge corrupted by drug prohibition is very likely to be corrupted in all other 
matters as well. 
Interestingly, when I tell these anecdotes to those who are committed to 
drug prohibition, most are completely unaffected by them. Shockingly, they are 
unmoved even by the murder of Frank, Arthur, and Michael. They argue that 
it was these young men's desire for marijuana, not drug prohibition, that is to 
blame. Some even imply by their tone that these three youths got what was 
coming to them. These claims imply either that death is an appropriate 
sanction for using marijuana or that we have more important concerns than the 
lives of these three young men. So much for the compassion allegedly 
motivating laws designed to protect potential drug user from themselves. Such 
compassion is highly selective. The mere fact that hundreds of thousands of 
citizens have lost their freedom, jobs, families, homes, health, or lives as a 
direct result of drug prohibition means little to committed prohibitionists7 and 
4. This policy was reversed upon the defeat of Bernard Carey and the election of Richard M. Daley. 
5. Note that there are no local probes of federal law enforcement. 
6. I saw no indication of corruption among prosecutors during my tenure, and none was revealed by 
Operation Greylord. Of course, in Cook County, Illinois, one hardly needed to bribe the prosecutor when 
judges and police officers were so easily bribed. Still, against my advice, one of my fellow prosecutors left 
the office after two years to become a defense lawyer, telling me, "Randy, there's a lot of money to be 
made out there." He was later indicted and convicted during Operation Greylord for bribing judges. For 
those who smugly think that Cook County is sui generis, I warn you that it is not, and, in places that are 
not as bad, drug prohibition is rapidly erasing any remaining differences in degree. 
7. In this Review, I will have much to say that is critical about the rnindset of "prohibitionists"-by 
which I mean those who are strongly committed to and publicly advocate prohibition, and dismiss drug 
legalization and its proponents out of hand. I am not referring to the majority of Americans, who currently 
support prohibition but who are woefully uninformed of the harmful consequences of this policy. 
2598 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 103: 2593 
their allies in the media.8 Such is simply the price that "we" (read: others) 
must pay to fight against the consumption of demon drugs. 
It seems that no facts are sufficient to shake the prohibitionists' faith in 
this tragic policy. As I have suggested elsewhere, some persons act as though 
they are addicted to drug laws, with all the connotations of irrationality that 
term is meant to convey when applied to drug users.9 Consequently, they are 
unlikely to be swayed by the copious facts and arguments presented in 
America's Longest War10 by Yale Law Professor Steven B. Duke and 
attorney Albert C. Gross. Fortunately, the ranks of ardent prohibitionists are 
thinning. Those Americans who continue to support prohibition are 
increasingly receptive to possible alternatives. Their minds are open now as 
never before. For them, the publication of this book is timely indeed and they 
should avail themselves of it. 
The case against prohibition is overwhelming precisely because so many 
different types of considerations all point to a single solution: the legalization 
of illicit drugs. The complexity of the case against prohibition means, however, 
that it cannot be presented adequately by a few anecdotes or even a lengthy 
essay. Nothing less than a book-length treatment will suffice and, fortunately, 
that book has been published. America's Longest War is an ambitious effort 
to evaluate the effectiveness of the policy of prohibition.11 It accomplishes 
this by marshalling the empirical research that has been done on both drugs 
and drug prohibition and then offering persuasive analysis of this data. In this 
Review, I shall be able to touch upon only a few evocative highlights. 
In Part I, I relate some of the least known and most provocative facts that 
Duke and Gross report about licit and illicit drugs. In Part II, I discuss the 
8. I do not wish to suggest that the members of the media unifonnly favor prohibition. To the contrary, 
my experience with reporters suggests that many have a great sympathy for legalization. However, my 
experience also has taught me the limits of media influence. It takes two to tango. Those members of the 
media who wish to create a drumbeat for a particular policy or against a particular politician need 
collaborators who will continue to produce "news" stories-hearings, press conferences, studies, 
demonstrations, etc.-that they can cover. Many powerful special interests support drug prohibition; none 
oppose it. So, despite their willingness to consider legalization seriously, the media has little manufactured 
news to cover that would continually expose the public to negative stories about drug prohibition. 
Ironically, it is the comparative smallness of the iJlicit drug "problem" that makes ending this prohibition 
more difficult than ending alcohol prohibition. Too few people use illicit drugs to constitute a major 
political force. But they do make great heretics. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. 
9. See Randy E. Barnett, Curing the Drug-Law Addiction: The Harmful Side Effects of Legal 
Prohibition, in DEALING WITII DRUGS: CONSEQUENCES OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL 73 (Ronald Hamowy 
ed., 1987) [hereinafter DEAUNG WITII DRUGS]. Although I would prefer to confine the tenn "addiction" 
to the concept of physical dependence, prohibitionists do not do so. Instead, they alsq include the much 
fuzzier concept of psychological dependence. See id. at 74 n.l. This type of dependency refers to persons 
who continue to use drugs despite the demonstrable harm they are causing to themselves. In this sense, it 
is fair to say that some persons appear to oo addicted to drug Jaws. 
10. STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S LoNGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC 
CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS (1993) [hereinafter AMERICA'S LoNGEST WAR]. 
11. Nor is it alone. See DANIEL K. BENJAMIN & ROGER L. MILLER, UNDOING DRUGS: BEYOND 
LEGALIZATION (1991) (advocating end of federal prohibition, in favor of state-by-state experimentation); 
THE CRISIS IN DRUG PROHIBmON (David Boaz ed., 1990) (collection of essays questioning merits of drug 
prohibition); DEAUNG WITII DRUGS, supra note 9 (same). 
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origins of drug prohibition. If the merits of drug prohibition are to be 
questioned seriously, then the many myths about drug use must be 
challenged-and Duke and Gross have done so effectively. In Part ill, I relate 
the grave social costs of drug prohibition that Duke and Gross document and 
add a few they missed. The harmful consequences discussed in Part ill each 
reflect the morals of the stories with which I began this Review. 
In Part IV, I examine the prevailing "public policy" approach to 
lawmaking that is responsible for the origination and continuation of the drug 
war and advocate a more principled approach. As I make clear, this is not a 
critique of public policy analysis, the source of much very useful information. 
Rather, I criticize adherents of a public policy model of decisionmaking that 
rejects what they refer to as a "simplistic" or "doctrinaire" reliance on general 
principles or individual rights to decide questions of legal coercion. Instead, 
they posit that legal coercion is best guided by "public policy experts" who are 
competent to formulate "rational" solutions to what they abstractly define as 
"social" problems. I argue that the evidence presented in America's Longest 
War is an indictment, not only of the War on Drugs, but also of this method 
of legal decisionmaking, though Duke and Gross seem not to appreciate fully 
this important lesson. Although adherence to sound principles does not 
substitute for the knowledge provided by good public policy analysis, I explain 
why the use of legal coercion to pursue worthwhile public policy objectives 
should be constrained by principles or rights. 
Finally, in Part V, I briefly consider alternatives to the current regime of 
prohibition, including the form of legalization favored by Duke and Gross. 
Although far preferable to the status quo, I discuss how the principles 
identified in Part IV reveal deficiencies in their proposal. 
I. THE FACTS ABOUT LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS 
America's Longest War begins by comparing the harmfulness of legal 
drugs-tobacco and alcohol-with those substances-marijuana, heroin, and 
cocaine-against which the government supposedly has declared war.12 Duke 
and Gross organize their presentation of empirical research on each drug 
around its physical and psychological effects, its criminogenic effects, and its 
positive and negative health consequences. While the story they tell is not new, 
it is widely neglected. 
12. The "War on Drugs" is a misnomer. "War'' has actually been declared on drug users, their 
suppliers, and those persons whose property has allegedly been used by a drug user. This is a peculiar sort 
of war, in which the enemy consists mainly of citizens who, unlike other combatants, must not under any 
circumstances fight back. Of course, it is not a war at all-except perhaps a civil war. The metaphor of war 
is sheer bravado used by committed prohibitionists to enlist everyone in what is supposed to be a common 
struggle against a common enemy. 
2600 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 103: 2593 
Of all five of these drugs, tobacco is the one that is both the most clearly 
detrimental to the health of users (and perhaps even nonusers) and the most 
addictive. Even prisoners cannot be compelled to give up their addiction: 
In the summer of 1992, the State of Vermont decided to prohibit 
smoking in its prisons. A black market emerged and the price of a 
pack of cigarettes jumped nearly 2000 percent to a price of about $40. 
A single cigarette sold for $3, more than the price of a pack on the 
legitimate market. Threats and violence were used to get cigarettes. 
Some prisoners traded other drugs and sex for tobacco. In November 
1992, Vermont wisely rescinded its tobacco-in-prison prohibition. 13 
Interestingly, many who have been addicted to both tobacco and heroin 
"contend that kicking tobacco was more difficult than kicking heroin."14 
Duke and Gross show alcohol to be far more potentially harmful to one's 
health than marijuana: 
The adverse health consequences of chronic heavy drinking are 
staggering. When taken in large quantities-perhaps three or four 
ounces per day-alcohol is a poison that rivals nicotine in its 
pernicious effects on the human body .... It causes three types of 
liver damage: fatty deposits, hepatitis, and cirrhosis, the ninth-leading 
cause of death in 1986. Regular alcohol use can precipitate 
esophagitis, exacerbate peptic ulcers and increase the risk of 
gastrointestinal cancer and pancreatitis. Chronic alcohol abuse 
contributes to cardiac dysfunction and other cardiovascular disorders, 
including hypertension. Alcohol also adversely affects immune, 
endocrine and reproductive functions. 
Heavy; prolonged alcohol consumption also takes a terrible toll 
on the human brain, causing dementia, blackouts, seizures, 
hallucinations and peripheral neuropathy.15 
On the other hand, we all know that consuming alcohol in moderation causes 
few, if any, health problems. Numerous studies have even shown "that 
drinking moderately is associated with reduced cardiovascular disease, for both 
men and women."16 The reasons for this are a matter of considerable 
13. AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR, supra note 10, at 26. Duke and Gross also relate the story of the 
tobacco worker strike in Italy, where the state has a monopoly on tobacco: 
Within three weeks, the price of a pack of cigarettes rose as high as $35; prostitutes were 
pricing their services in cigarettes; a man was mugged in Florence with the threat, ''Your 
cigarettes or your life." Smokers created miles of stalled traffic while driving to Switzerland and 
France to buy tobacco. 
/d. at 26-27. 
14. !d. at 26 (endnotes omitted). 
15. /d. at 34 (endnotes omitted). I have included here only a fraction of the adverse health effects 
reported by Duke and Gross. 
16. /d. at 35-36 (emphasis added). 
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speculation, but the phenomenon is well confirmed by much empirical 
research. 
With respect to alcohol, experience should have taught us that prohibition 
would (and did) eliminate the potential benefits of alcohol for many without 
eliminating its abuse by those who are willing to flout the law. At a minimum, 
those who favor prohibition as a way of protecting would-be alcohol abusers 
from themselves are willing to prevent others from enjoying the health and 
other benefits of consuming alcohol in moderation. Drinking in moderation 
requires individual judgment of the sort that is required in every other facet of 
life: it simply cannot be dictated from above. 
Alcohol is also more conducive to violence, at least in our culture, than 
either cocaine or heroin. Duke and Gross find that "[o]n balance, ... the data 
seem to support the common understanding or folklore that [alcohol] 
intoxication leads to violence."17 In comparison, the criminogenic effects of 
both cocaine and, especially, heroin are relatively benign: 
At one time, it was commonly claimed that the propensity of addicts 
to commit crimes was directly caused by the drug's effect on the 
brain, producing moral weakness and a thirst for violence. Such 
claims have from time to time been made about every recreational 
drug, even tobacco. But there has never been any evidence to support 
the theory with respect to heroin, any more than there was any 
support for identical claims about marijuana. No intelligent person 
really believes such theories today. On the contrary, the prevailing 
view is that much, perhaps most, of the addict's criminality is simply 
and solely the result of the interaction of his addiction and the law's 
prohibition.18 
Prohibitionists respond that the demonstrable harmfulness of alcohol and 
tobacco does not justify expanding the number of harmful substances legally 
available to Americans. This assumes, however, that increased choices will 
necessarily increase the number of drug abusers. As Duke and Gross 
repeatedly emphasize, it overlooks the extent to which persons seeking to 
abuse intoxicating drugs make their choices from among the drugs available 
to them.19 Prohibitionists also overlook the extent to which prohibited 
17. !d. at 40. 
18. /d. at 64 (emphasis added) (endnote omitted). 
19. For example, Duke and Gross explain: 
Most people who use recreational drugs do not want to die or become addicted; they simply 
assume the risk of doing so because they have little choice other than forgoing the drug. Were 
prohibition repealed, many people who now smoke crack, snort cocaine powder or mainline 
heroin would revert to the forms of these drugs that existed prior to the Harrison Act: liquid 
potions like the original Coca Cola, laudanum, or Mariani's wine; or low-potency tablets. These 
diluted forms of cocaine and opiates are far safer and less addictive than the forms that 
prohibition has produced. 
/d. at 197. 
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drugs-especially marijuana-are far less detrimental to health than those now 
legally available, in which case substitution would be an improvement. 
Despite years of federally subsidized research, the claimed adverse health 
effects of marijuana are still highly speculative. 
Approximately 100 million Americans over the past three decades 
have smoked (or eaten) marijuana. Millions of these have used 
marijuana on a regular, almost daily basis for decades. Despite these 
massive numbers of long-term users, no reliable evidence has 
appeared that such use has any adverse effects on their physical 
health .... 
Other societies have used marijuana for centuries. Yet in no 
society has any official or respected study found serious adverse 
physical effects on humans from smoking marijuana. Indeed, in no 
less than nine official investigations of the problem, in both the 
United States and elsewhere, none have found any significant adverse 
effects on human health, even mental health.20 
Duke and Gross report that "no death from a marijuana overdose has ever been 
established."21 
Moreover, marijuana offers significant and, in some cases, unique 
therapeutic benefits. 
Clinical and research evidence has established that marijuana has 
clear therapeutic value for some illnesses. . . . 
The most widely accepted and best-documented medical use of 
marijuana is the alleviation of nausea that accompanies use of some 
chemotherapy drugs .... 
Some cancer-chemotherapy drugs are extremely toxic substances, 
which often cause patients to retch violently. The vomiting is so 
overpowering and uncomfortable that many cancer patients develop 
anticipatory nausea, which eventually makes it impossible for them to 
participate in chemotherapy. Marijuana-provided illegally by 
compassionate nurses, doctors, family members or friends-has 
prolonged or saved the lives of many cancer victims.22 
Marijuana is an effective treatment for glaucoma, the vision-threatening 
pressure that can develop in the eyes. It is also an effective analgesic, relieving 
chronic pain. 23 
Nonetheless, countless people continue to be imprisoned for growing and 
consuming this plant. The Salcedo brothers and Frank Mussa were murdered 
trying to purchase this drug from illicit sources. The federal Drug Enforcement 
20. /d. at 51. 
21. /d. 
22. /d. at 185-87 (endnotes omitted). 
23. See id. at I 86-87. 
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Administration continues to classify m.arijuana as a Schedule I 
substance-meaning that it is both highly dangerous and has no known medical 
use-despite the fact that in 1988 its own chief administrative law judge, 
Francis L. Young, recommended that marijuana be rescheduled to permit 
doctors to prescribe it to patients. He concluded: 
The evidence in this record clearly shows that marijuana has been 
accepted as capable of relieving the distress of great numbers of very 
ill people, and doing so with safety under medical supervision. It 
would be unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious for the DEA to 
continue to stand between those sufferers and the benefits of this 
substance in light of the evidence.24 
Duke and Gross report that "John C. Lawn, the administrator of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, rejected Young's recommendations. Lawn ordered 
that marijuana's Schedule I classification be retained."25 
In war, it is said, truth is the first casualty. To be blunt, many committed 
prohibitionists inside and outside of government who profess to care so much 
about the morals of others routinely lie or willfully mislead the public about 
nearly every aspect of both drugs and the policy of prohibition.26 Our 
consistent experience with diug prohibition-from marijuana, to heroin, to 
cocaine-is that when careful empirical studies are eventually performed, they 
reveal the initial official accounts to be either false or wildly exaggerated.27 
Rarely, if ever, does law enforcement then reverse itself or even moderate its 
rhetoric. 
24. Id. at 184. 
25. !d. 
26. For example, Duke and Gross discuss the famous televised address in which President Bush 
announced the escalation of the drug war. To illustrate that the drug trade had become so pervasive and 
brazen that it now extended to within a few yards of the White House, Bush held up a bag of crack cocaine 
that had been sold to undercover law enforcement officers by 19-year-old drug dealer Keith Jackson in 
Lafayette Park directly across from the White House. But "[f]ar from being a regular trader at that venue, 
Jackson needed travel directions from his sham 'customers' to enable him to find the White House." !d. 
at xv. In sum, to help justify prohibition, either the President of the United States or his law enforcement 
agents (or both) lied to or willfully misled the American people about the extent of the drug trade. 
27. PCP, for example, was declared by prohibitionist authorities to be the monster drug of the 
1970's-a reputation that has survived to this day-despite the fact that little about its effects had been 
scientifically demonstrated at the time: 
Some reports in the scientific literature associate violence with PCP use. Users, however, do 
not. .•• When violence occurred it was either against property or a panic reaction to restraint 
attempts ...• PCP can appeal to those looking for: euphoria (low dose); a wasted, body-wide 
anesthetic effect with supersensitivity to sensations-the out-of-body stage (a moderate dose); 
or an incoherent, immobile, conscious state (a high dose). If you're having trouble getting a feel 
for PCP, you're in good company. Even users can't agree what the experience is like. One third 
of PCP users say it's unique, another third sat it's like the hallucinogens or marijuana, and the 
last third isn't sure. When neither the users, the researchers, nor the clinicians can agree on the 
experience, the mechanisms, or the symptoms, you know that more research is needed. 
OAKLEY RAY, DRUGS, SOCIE'IY, & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 415-16 (1983). Notwithstanding the surfeit of 
scientific knowledge, the use and sale of PCP was prohibited. 
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Duke and Gross present even more counterintuitive evidence about heroin 
and cocaine. Although both drugs are far less benign than marijuana-and 
Duke and Gross do not skimp in describing these adverse effects-neither is 
the monster it has been depicted by prohibitionists. For example: 
Most users of cocaine suffer no serious physical or social 
problems from it. That is why even people who should have known 
better trumpeted it during the seventies as a nonaddictive, harmless 
drug. Before the crack era, only a fraction of cocaine users developed 
dependence upon cocaine. Estimates range from about 2 percent to 20 
percent, with 5 to 10 percent being a reasonable approximation. 28 
And as for heroin: 
As with marijuana, study after study has failed to find that the 
regular use of heroin, in conditions of relatively free availability, 
produces any substantial adverse effects on mental or physical health. 
As put by Edward Brecher, ''There is . . . general agreement 
throughout the medical and psychiatric literature that the overall 
effects of opium, morphine, and heroin on the addict's mind and body 
under conditions of low price and ready availability are on the whole 
amazingly bland."29 
Even the notorious heroin overdose is itself a mystery. Because resistance 
enables heroin addicts to inject massive quantities of the drug without adverse 
effects,30 the most likely causes of heroin overdoses are drugs that are "cut" 
with substances such as quinine which can cause severe allergic reactions, the 
consumption of heroin in combination with alcohol or barbiturates, and 
unexpectedly pure doses of heroin (known as "hot shots") provided to 
unwitting users either by accident or as a way of murdering bothersome 
customers, persons suspected of being informants, and even persons who for 
one reason or another have become problems for corrupt law enforcement 
agents. 
At some juncture, however, one must wonder about the point of producing 
evidence of the actual effects of illicit drugs. A system that can criminalize a 
substance as demonstrably benign as marijuana can hardly be expected to make 
a "rational" decision concerning heroin and cocaine. Therein lies the weakness 
of government by "public policy"-a subject to which I shall return in Part IV. 
28. AMERICA'S LoNGEST WAR, supra note 10, at 70-71. 
29. ld. at 62. 
30. See id. at 63 ("Addicts who build up tolerance can inject an enormous quantity of heroin without 
killing themselves .... There is ... no established dosage of unadulterated heroin that is clearly sufficient 
to kill an addict, yet addicts die every day from their injections."). 
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ll. THE ORIGINS OF DRUG PROHIBffiON 
After considering the effects of the drugs themselves, Duke and Gross 
trace the origins of drug prohibition. The history is fascinating. Each step 
along the way involved not only deliberate fabrications about the drug in 
question, but also racial stereotypes and prejudice.31 For example, cocaine 
was thought to be a drug favored by blacks, and prohibitionists feared that this 
subculture would spread to the white middle class. The prohibitionists also 
believed that drugs such as cocaine, marijuana, and opium "might inspire 
minority males to act violently or express sexual interest in white women."32 
Marijuana was also identified with "violent" Mexicans. Ironically in light of 
the widespread propaganda by prohibitionists today that drug use inevitably 
leads to lack of productivity and social withdrawal, Samuel Gompers and 
organized labor were among the leaders of the movement against opium. 
Gompers "complained that their opium use gave Chinese immigrant workers 
an unfair advantage in the labor market. The Chinese were said to be able to 
work longer and harder because of the drug.'m 
Less well known, but no less important is the unintended role that 
organized medicine played in promoting prohibition. The initial regulation of 
cocaine and opiates was designed to eliminate competition posed to 
"legitimate" physicians and pharmacists from other sources of cocaine and 
opium. 
The practitioners of nineteenth-century medicine had little power 
to cure disease. The main thing the physician could do was to make 
the patient feel better, and "opiates were preeminent for these 
functions and were apparently used with great frequency." The 
physician was in competition with the pharmacist, however, since both 
could and did dispense opiates and other drugs. In fact, both were in 
competition with the comer grocery store; anyone could sell drugs to 
anyone else. The physicians and pharmacists needed to have this 
changed. The change began in England, with the Pharmacy and 
Poisons Act of 1868, which forbade the sale of opiates by anyone 
other than a pharmacist.34 
In 1914, the same movement led to the Harrison Act in the United States. 
Contrary to popular opinion today, that Act 
31. See id. at 82-83, 90-94. The influence of racial and ethnic prejudice on the origins of drug 
prohibition is discussed in more detail in Ronald Hamowy, Introduction: Illicit Drugs and Government 
Control, in DEAUNG WlTil DRUGS, supra note 9, at I, 12-13, 17, 26. 
32. AMERICA'S LoNGEST WAR, supra note 10, at 83. They continue: "Thus, after much racist anti-
Chinese agitation, California's legislature in 1881 outlawed the opium dens where the San Francisco police 
claimed they had 'found white women and Chinamen side by side under the effects of this drug-a 
humiliating sight to anyone with anything left of manhood."' I d. 
33. Id. at 59. 
34. Id. at 82 (citations omitted). 
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fell far short of outright prohibition of cocaine and opiate distribution. 
First, it exempted potions and patent medicines sold over-the-counter 
and by mail order if the concentrations were below specified limits. 
Second, pharmacists could sell the drugs on prescription by a 
physician, and physicians could prescribe them. Physicians could also 
distribute the drugs themselves, and were not even required to keep 
records of their distributions on house calls. Drug distribution had 
become medicalized in America.35 
Duke and Gross cite approvingly Edward Brecher's statement that "[f]ar from 
appearing to be a prohibition law, the Harrison Narcotic Act on its face was 
merely a law for the orderly marketing of opium, morphine, heroin, and other 
drugs."36 
The right of the physician to prescribe was spelled out in seemingly 
unambiguous terms: "Nothing ... in this section shall apply ... to 
the dispensing or distribution of any of the aforesaid drugs to a patient 
by a physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon registered under this Act 
in the course of his professional practice only." Says Brecher, "It is 
unlikely that a single legislator realized in 1914 that the law Congress 
was passing would later be deemed a prohibition law.'m 
Although not noted by Duke and Gross, this legislation was actually part 
of a bigger picture. Today we commonly identify "morals" legislation with 
fundamentalist religious movements and believe that these statutes have existed 
since colonial days. Most laws of this sort, however, were actually first enacted 
during the Progressive Era as part of a much broader push by organized 
medicine to "medicalize" conduct that formerly had been thought of as evil or 
sinful, but of a private nature. This movement led to a variety of new laws 
prohibiting all sorts of "unhealthy" conduct, including sexual conduct. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, medical science had 
elaborated a comprehensive doctrine relating sexual indulgence and 
mental disease. As a result, when, largely at the urging of physicians 
and moral reformers, a flood of legislation restricting sexual conduct 
was introduced in the period from 1880 to 1920, the theoretical 
foundation, scope, and direction of these new laws were provided 
primarily by the scientific conclusions earlier reached by physicians 
and psychiatrists.38 
35. Id. at 84. 
36. Id. at 85. 
37. Id. 
38. Ronald Harnowy, Preventive Medicine and the Criminalization of Sexual Immorality in Nineteenth 
Century America, in ASSESSING TilE CRIMINAL: RESTmrr!ON, RETR!BunON, AND TIIE LEGAL PROCESS 35, 
44 (Randy E. Barnett & John Hagel ill eds., 1977). Harnowy notes: 
[I]n 1915 alone-not an atypical year with respect to this kind of legislation-Qver eighty bills 
concerning the regulation of sexual behavior were introduced into the state legislatures, of 
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This effort led as far as statutes in both Indiana (enacted in 1881) and 
Wyoming (enacted in 1890) that included the following language in their 
criminal codes: ''Whosoever entices, allures, instigates or aids any person under 
the age of twenty-one years to commit masturbation or self-pollution shall be 
deemed guilty of sodomy."39 
Ironically, then, the Harrison Act, enacted during this period to medicalize 
drug distribution, became legal prohibition as a result of its contrary 
interpretation by law enforcement authorities. They argued "that addiction is 
not a 'disease,' the addict who seeks a maintenance dose is therefore not a 
'patient' and maintenance doses are therefore not supplied 'in the course of [a 
doctor's) professional practice.">4° In United States v. Jin Fuey Moy,41 the 
Lochner-era Supreme Court initially rejected this interpretation: 
Only words from which there is no escape could warrant the 
conclusion that Congress meant to strain its powers almost if not quite 
to the breaking point in order to make the probably very large 
proportion of citizens who have some preparation of opium in their 
possession criminal or at least prima facie criminal and subject to the 
serious punishment made possible by§ 9. It may be assumed that the 
statute has a moral end as well as revenue in view, but we are of 
opinion that the District Court, in treating those ends as to be reached 
which over half were passed into law. These included statutes dealing with the age of consent, 
indecent exposure, obscene publications, sexual perversion, adultery, fornication, and various 
aspects of prostitution-including pandering, pimping, keeping a house of prostitution, 
soliciting, and transporting for the purposes of prostitution. The rationale, eagerly adopted by 
the state legislatures, that excused such wholesale incursions into the private lives of citizens 
was that provided by medical science-namely, that these new laws did not issue from any 
attempt to enforce a particular value system but were scientifically grounded in the conclusions 
reached by preventive medicine and sexual hygiene. Their aim was not to make Americans 
moral, but to prevent them from becoming sick. 
/d. at 75-76. 
39. /d. at 78. Hamowy extensively discusses the widespread belief among physicians and psychiatrists 
in the late nineteenth century that, like so-called "gateway" drugs today, chronic masturbation led to 
insanity and to other types of sexual misconduct and therefore justified coercively subjecting females to 
clitoridectomies and males to castration and "infibulation." See id. at 44-69. 
Infibulation ... consisted of piercing the prepuce at the root of the glans wilh a silver needle, 
the ends of which were then tied together. The result, we are informed, was erections to [sic] 
painful as to be practically impossible, and an almost certain end to masturbation among the 
patients upon whom he had operated. 
/d. at 59. Nor did this movement lack adherents. In a paper that received widespread publicity when 
presented to the International Medico-Legal Congress in 1893, Dr. F.E. Daniel 
was injudicious enough to drop the pretense of employing castration as a therapeutic measure 
for masturbation. Rather, he suggested the procedure be used primarily as a punishment for all 
sexual perverts, including habitual masturbators. "It is not alone in asylums," he holds, "that 
castration should be done .•.. Rape, sodomy, bestiality, pederasty and habitual masturbation 
should be made crimes or misdemeanors, punishable by forfeiture of all rights, including that 
of procreation; in short by castration, or castration plus other penalties, according to the gravity 
of the offense." 
/d. at 64. Hamowy reports that this paper "was published in no fewer than three medical journals." /d. 
40. AMERICA'S loNGEST WAR, supra note 10, at 85. 
41. 241 u.s. 394 (1916). 
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only through a revenue measure and within the limits of a revenue 
measure, was right.42 
Three years later, after the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment requiring 
alcohol prohibition, the government's interpretation was accepted by the Court 
in the 5-4 decision of Webb v. United States. 43 In the companion case of 
United States v. Doremus,44 the dissent made clear its view that the 
government's assertion of power under the Harrison Act was beyond the 
delegated powers of the federal government and represented an unconstitutional 
violation of the Tenth Amendment.45 "In any event," write Duke and Gross, 
"by 1919 we had acquired-almost by accident and contrary to the will of the 
1914 Congress-opiate and cocaine prohibition along with alcohol 
prohibition."46 The Marijuana Tax Act followed in 1937. 
Duke and Gross also consider recent revisionist accounts of alcohol 
prohibition, which contend that the Great Experiment was not the unmitigated 
disaster it is usually thought to be. Duke and Gross conclude that "if 
consumption of alcohol was reduced, it wasn't by much; the costs of 
enforcement, in money, corruption, crime, disrespect for law, alcohol and 
related poisonings far exceeded, by virtually anyone's measurements, the tiny 
gains in alcohol control."47 Alcohol prohibition did lead Americans to shift 
their consumption patterns away from comparatively less potent forms of 
alcohol such as wine and beer-the production and distribution of which were 
more easily detected by law enforcement-to distilled spirits, which were more 
concentrated, easier to manufacture in illicit stills, and consequently more 
42. /d. at 402. 
43. 249 U.S. 96 (I9I9). Duke and Gross explain this reversal: 
[A] marked change in attitude toward drugs had occurred. We had fought World War I, the I 8th 
Amendment requiring Prohibition had been passed, and we fell into a perio~ of intolerant, 
suspicious nationalism. According to David Musto, drug addiction by 1918 was perceived as 
a threat to the national war effort. 
AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR, supra note I 0, at 86. To appreciate better the judicial reaction to the ratification 
of alcohol prohibition, consider that today any newly developed intoxicant that can be used as a substitute 
for a currently illegal drug is instantly prohibited without any scientific showing of dangerousness. 
44. 249 u.s. 86 (I9I9). 
45. /d. at 95 (White, C.J., dissenting). The four dissenters adopted the reasoning of the district court 
which dismissed the indictment on the ground that the regulation of the practice of medicine was a reserved 
power retained by the states. The lower court contended: 
To extend the incidental moral objects of the taxing measure by a liberal construction would 
be to unfairly and without certain right encroach upon the state's sovereign powers .... 
It is accordingly held that the indictment does not state an offense against the laws of the 
United States, in that the acts of the defendant charged in the words of the statute to have been 
omitted and committed therein are violations of police regulations incidental to the taxing 
putpose of the act, but which do not tend to render effectual its prime object, revenue. To that 
extent the act is in violation of article 10 of the amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States. 
United States v. Doremus, 246 F. 958, 965 (W.D. Tex. 19I8). Of course, those were the quaint old days 
when Congress thought it needed to enact a constitutional amendment to empower it to prohibit the 
manufacture and distribution of alcohol. 
46. AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR, supra note IO, at 86. 
47. /d. at 90. 
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difficult to police. It has taken several decades for this Prohibition-induced 
taste for "cocktails" to abate and for the more traditional preference for wine 
and beer to reassert itself-much to the chagrin of distillers. 
Experience with alcohol prohibition reveals that making a highly desired 
substance illegal creates powerful economic incentives to find substitutes that 
are cheaper and easier to produce, in part, because their manufacture or 
importation are not currently the target of law enforcement efforts. Perhaps 
most destructively, prohibition leads to more concentrated or potent intoxicants 
that are easier to conceal from law enforcement during distribution, but which 
may be more dangerous to consume. The prohibition of cocaine, opium, and 
marijuana has shared this pathology. Duke and Gross chronicle how the 
artificially high costs of cocaine created by prohibition begat the invention of 
the more addictive but much less expensive "crack" cocaine. 
When administered intranasally, cocaine reaches the brain in three 
to five minutes. But when cocaine is smoked, the brain is bathed in 
about eight seconds. The effects from smoking are also highly 
concentrated whereas they are more diffuse with other methods. As 
a result, a very small quantity of cocaine can produce an intense 
though brief high if smoked. The discovery of crack reduced the cost 
of a single cocaine high from about $30 to $3 or $4, thus placing a 
crack high within the financial grasp of virtually everyone. Cocaine, 
which had been by far the most costly dru~-about four times as 
expensive as heroin-became democratized.4 
Thus, at about the time that affluent consumers were souring on the drug, the 
higher prices of powdered cocaine caused by prohibition led to the invention 
of a cheaper and more dangerous form of the drug, thereby greatly broadening 
the market for cocaine among the poor. 
Furthermore, in cultures where opiates are legal, they are primarily 
consumed by smoking, snorting, or inhaling heated fumes. Each of these 
practices may lead to addiction, but only rarely if ever to death or disease. 
Injection, a more efficient method of consumption resulting from the 
artificially high prices created by prohibition, carries with it the dangers of 
overdose and now AIDS, and much more easily leads to dependency. "[B]efore 
the Harrison Act," wrote John Kaplan, "when opiates were cheap and plentiful, 
they were very rarely injected. Moreover, injection is rare in those Asian 
countries where opiates are inexpensive and easily available.'>49 And, as Duke 
and Gross note, "[i]n Hong Kong, where needles are legal and cheap, there is 
no drug-related AIDS."50 
48. !d. at 69. 
49. JOHN KAPLAN, THE HARDEST DRUG: HEROIN AND PUBLIC POLICY 128 (1983). 
50. AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR, supra note 10, at 194. 
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In their discussion of the history of prohibition, however, Duke and Gross 
neglect the role played by U.S.-sponsored spraying of Mexican marijuana 
fields with the toxic defoliant paraquat in the 1970's in shifting consumer 
demand in the 1980's towards cocaine.51 Forced by the destruction of 
Mexican fields and the consumer's reluctance to buy potentially tainted 
marijuana,52 drug suppliers turned to Colombia as a source of unsprayed 
marijuana. 53 When the Drug Enforcement Agency responded by strengthening 
its interdiction efforts in South Florida and the Caribbean, distributors began 
to favor the more concentrated Colombian cocaine over bulkier, easier-to-
detect marijuana.54 Suppliers told consumers that the newly plentiful cocaine 
was an excellent, if not superior, substitute for marijuana. Consumers tried it 
and liked it, until experience with the drug eventually revealed it to be more 
subject to abuse than had previously been thought. By the 1990's, demand 
among the more affluent had begun to shift back to marijuana, much of it 
domestically cultivated--only now to strains with much greater potency. 
In sum, to avoid detection by law enforcement, the predictable response 
of drug producers and distributors is to produce more concentrated forms of 
intoxicants. Because they are more potent, these new versions are often more 
dangerous to consumers. Here, as elsewhere, the unintended consequences of 
prohibition are as pervasive as they are destructive. 
ill. THE SOCIAL COSTS OF DRUG PROHIBffiON 
The costs imposed on both drug users and nonusers by drug prohibition 
are so massive and complex that they cannot fairly be summarized here. The 
adverse effects on the legal system alone, some of which I attempted to 
illustrate by the anecdotes with which I began this essay, are stunning. 
Undeniably, drug prohibition greatly increases both property crime (to pay for 
artificially inflated drug prices) and violent crime (to protect drug-dealing 
territory and to rob and kill those suspected of having valuable drugs or money 
from the drug trade). Perhaps just as important but less well recognized is the 
diversion of scarce resources away from other crimes or other nonlegal uses: 
51. Although they neglect this episode in their history of prohibition in Chapter 5, they do mention 
it in passing later in the book when discussing why the drug war cannot succeed. See id. at 217 
("Marijuana eradication turned some users on to cocaine."). They also note that a "1989 DEA study found 
that 7 percent of the nation's marijuana is contaminated by paraquat. Thus, for the sake of drug prohibition, 
our government has been willing to expose a significant percentage of America's 21 million pot smokers 
to poisoning by a toxic chemical." Id. at 195 (endnotes omitted). 
52. Although paraquat is a defoliant intended to destroy crops, when they see their fields sprayed, 
growers try to harvest and send their now-tainted plants to market before the plants die. 
53. See Thomas E. Ricks, The Cocaine Business: Big Risks and Profits, High Labor Tumo~·er, WALL 
ST. J., June 30, 1986, at AI ("The destruction of the Mexican crop gave Colombia marijuana growers a 
shot at the U.S. market ... . ");see also Alan Riding, Shaken Colombia Acts at Last on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 11, 1984, at A1, A16. 
54. See Ricks, supra note 53, at A16 (describing how suppliers "decided to drop bulky marijuana in 
favor of cocaine, which is easier to move by air"). 
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As of 1989, drug possessors and traffickers represented roughly 21 
percent to 24 percent of the 395,553 inmates of the nation's county 
and municipal jails and an estimated 25 percent to 35 percent of the 
710,054 convicts serving sentences in the state and federal prisons. 
Thus, in 1989, drug prohibition forced our penal institutions to 
warehouse somewhere between 260,000 and 343,000 people, who 
otherwise would not have burdened that system. If we add those who 
were imprisoned not for drug crimes but for drug-related crimes (such 
as crimes to get drug money, or murders and assaults arising out of 
the drug business) we could include another 150,000 to the total. 
Thus, about half of our penal population is there because of drug 
prohibition. 55 
The misery inflicted on those swept up into the legal system, those who are 
victimized by both violent and nonviolent offenders subject to "early release" 
programs designed to make room for the influx of drug offenders, and those 
whose crimes are not pursued because police or prosecutors are instead 
pursuing drug offenders is staggering. To use the terminology of economics, 
these are among the "opportunity costs" of prohibition. 
The most ardent prohibitionists are also typically the most concerned with 
the breakdown of the family and the rise of the "underclass," especially in the 
inner cities. Yet, none of these partisans takes into account how their own 
favored policy of drug prohibition contributes to these phenomena: 
Nationwide, one out of four black males in his twenties is in prison 
or under some form of court supervision, such as probation or parole. 
Of black males aged eighteen to thirty-five, the court-enmeshed figure 
is 42 percent in Washington, D.C., and a mind-boggling 56 percent 
in Baltimore. Fewer than one in sixteen white males of the same age 
are caught up in the criminal justice system. 
As many as 70 percent of black men in Washington D.C., are 
arrested before they tum thirty-five. Although about 77 percent of 
current illegal-drug users are white ... [n]ationwide, about 45 percent 
of drug arrests are of African-Americans . 
. . . The young people who are punished more severely than many 
murderers, rapists or bank robbers lose any residual opportunities for 
a productive life and are taken from their mates and their children. 
Many forces help to produce the deplorable absence of fathers in the 
rearing of America's black children, but a major force is drug 
prohibition. 56 
Duke and Gross also devote a chapter to the effect of drug prohibition on 
our constitutional liberties. Police are literally busting down doors throughout 
55. AMERICA'S LoNGEST WAR, supra note 10, at 179 (endnotes omitted). 
56. ld. at 169-70. 
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the United States: Some of these home invasions are even televised on such 
programs as Cops.51 The Supreme Court has so deferred to police decisions 
to search and arrest in drug cases that some scholars now speak of the "drug 
exception" to the Bill of Rights.58 Duke and Gross describe many areas in 
which the powers of law enforcement have greatly expanded and the 
constitutional protections afforded all citizens have contracted. I will list only 
a few: the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches or 
seizures has been severely weakened by a variety of new exceptions, the Sixth 
Amendment's right to counsel has been weakened by the prosecution of 
criminal defense lawyers, the traditional right to an appeal of criminal 
convictions has been relaxed in drug cases by eliminating oral arguments and 
published opinions,59 and the property rights acknowledged by the Fifth 
Amendment have been greatly undermined by civil asset forfeitures. When the 
drug war finally ends, these rights and freedoms will only be regained with 
great struggle. 
Apparently, no price is too high to keep a comparatively small minority 
of Americans from getting high. The underlying logic and motivation of the 
war on drugs can perhaps best be understood as a modern example of the 
theory used to justify the Inquisition: the doctrine of righteous persecution. 
Drug use is heresy and heretics must be punished for their own good as well 
as to preserve the morality of society. 60 As explained by George Smith: 
57. I advise those evaluating the merits of drug prohibition to watch this show. Although critics 
condemn such "reality-based" programs as too violent, the violence on Cops is usually committed by the 
police during drug busts, and it is real, not a re-enactment. Real as well is the demonstration of how the 
privacy of one's home and car is now virtually nonexistent in poorer neighborhoods-both minority and 
white. That audiences do not consider the police conduct on this show outrageous is a disturbing sign of 
the extent to which the drug war has undermined the public's understanding of and support for 
constitutional rights. 
58. See Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257 
(1984); Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS 
LJ. 889 (1987). But see Diane-Michele Krasnow, To Stop the Scourge: The Supreme Court's Approach 
to the War on Drugs, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 219 (1992) (arguing that recent changes in the Court's Fourth, 
Sixth, and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence reflect "a pragmatic balance between stopping the scourge of 
drugs and protecting the Bill of Rights"). 
59. Duke and Gross quote the late civil libertarian Justice Thurgood Marshall as saying, "If it's a dope 
case, I won't even read the petition. I ain't giving no break to no dope dealer." AMERICA's LONGESl' WAR, 
supra note 10, at 134. 
60. See GEORGE H. SMITII, ATIIEISM, AYN RAND, AND OniER HERESIES 233-37 (1991). 
Can coercion change a person's beliefs and compel him to do good? No, said Augustine, 
but coercion can provide an incentive to avoid evil: 'The fear of punishment ... keeps the evil 
desire from escaping beyond the bounds of thought." Persecution can break the bonds of habit 
and induce the heretic "to change his purpose for the better." 
Drug inquisitors offer the same justification for their righteous persecution of drug 
consumers. But what of those consumers who don't change their habits even after they are 
punished? Augustine faced the same problem with heretics who had stubbornly refused to 
embrace Catholicism. His response has been echoed by a long line of drug inquisitors: "Is the 
art of healing, therefore, to be abandoned, because the malady of some is incurable?" 
!d. at 234-35. 
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The modern drug inquisitor is another Augustine dressed in 
secular garb. Whereas Augustine sought to save the religious heretic 
from a literal hell, the modern inquisitor seeks to "save" the social 
heretic (the drug consumer) from the metaphorical "hell" of his 
"addiction." And just as Augustine's theory wreaked havoc in 
previous centuries-so the same theory, when secularized and applied 
to the "war on drugs," has created social turmoil and devastated 
hundreds of thousands of lives through imprisonment.61 
This persecution is made possible by the demonization of drug users and by 
their relatively small numbers. 
The religious nature of the anti-drug crusade is exemplified by then-drug 
"czar" William Bennett's call that California drastically increase its punishment 
of casual marijuana users. ''The possession of all illegal drugs, even in small 
amounts-so-called personal-use amounts-should be punished."62 
Noting that hard-core drug users constitute only 30 percent of the 
drug-taking population, Bennett said he wants to go after casual users, 
who may consume controlled substances once a week or even less 
often. He advocated steps such as seizing property or suspending 
drivers licenses to dissuade casual users from buying illegal drugs. He 
also called on states to enact legislation patterned after federal law 
that sets civil fines up to $10,000 for those convicted of selling small 
amounts of drugs.63 
According to Bennett's own estimates, seventy percent of those who consume 
intoxicants do so "once a week or even less often." For consuming drugs with 
this degree of moderation, they should be punished, their property seized, and 
their drivers licenses suspended. Moderate users may not harm themselves, but 
they belie the ardent prohibitionist view that drug use is invariably self-
destructive.64 Yet such persecution is politically feasible because of the 
relatively small number of citizens affected. Shortly after Bennett made this 
statement, government surveys placed the number of casual marijuana and 
cocaine users nationwide at 14.5 million.65 
61. Id. at 233-34. 
62. Ray Tessler, Drug Chief Urges California To Reverse Its Easy Pot Laws, S.F. CHRON., July 20, 
1989, at A4. 
63. ld. 
64. Bennett's professed rationale for this increase is revealing: 
"It's a national embarrassment that we are the third-largest exporter in the world of marijuana'' 
and at the same time press foreign governments to crack down on drug production, he said. 
"We cannot be saying to other countries 'you've got to get rid of those drugs or eradicate those 
drugs' until we get rid of them ourselves," Bennett said. 
Id. Nowhere does he assert that, by consuming drugs once a week or less, the overwhelming majority of 
users are harming themselves. Rather the punishment of these people is the means to larger public policy 
ends. 
65. See Michael Isikoff, Federal Study Shocks Drug Expens: "Casual" Use of Pot, Cocaine Plummets, 
but Coke Addiction Rises, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 1, 1989, at AI (stating that casual use of marijuana and 
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Duke and Gross add to this comparison of drug prohibition and religious 
persecution by noting that because drugs provide an alternative type of 
"religious" experience, they have been viewed as threats to established 
religions. "Precisely because the two psychic experiences, religion and drugs, 
are competitive, the use of drugs is often declared morally evil or 
blasphemous."66 In sum, because drugs compete with religions by promising 
an alternative form of mystical experience, we can expect established religions 
to condemn them. Moreover, Duke and Gross argue that most mainstream 
religions have integrated some use of intoxicants into their ceremonies. "Wine, 
especially, enjoys lofty roles in religious sacraments. The use of other drugs 
is a challenge both to the special religious status of alcohol and to the religions 
which confer such status upon it."67 
The analogy to the religious persecution of the Inquisition helps us to 
understand how so many people can be so indifferent to the suffering created 
by drug prohibition. And those who wonder how otherwise moral and decent 
people could stand by while religious dissenters were systematically 
imprisoned, tortured, and murdered on account of their religious beliefs should 
reflect upon their own indifference to the treatment of drug consumers. 
IY. FROM POLICY TO PRINCIPLE 
Trying to summarize the analysis presented in Americas Longest War is 
extremely frustrating. Far more must be omitted here than can be included and 
what is included seems almost arbitrary. Yet, as I shall explain in this Part, the 
very difficulty of presenting such massiv~ and complicated analysis is 
symptomatic of the most basic mistake that is made in thinking about the 
criminalization of conduct. 
Drug prohibition is a product of the prevailing "public policy model" of 
decisionmaking. This model has three necessary components: (1) "public-
policy experts" formulate "rational" solutions to "social" problems; (2) these 
solutions invariably require implementation by government coercion, either to 
mandate or prohibit citizen conduct or to dispense money collected by taxation; 
(3) this government coercion requires ratification by elected legislators and 
executive officials. This model contemplates only two active branches of 
government, with courts playing a subservient role. In this model, the courts' 
function is limited to determining whether particular persons have in fact 
violated a properly enacted statute. To pass upon the statute itself would be to 
make a "policy judgment," something that unelected, unaccountable judges are 
unqualified to do. 
cocaine fell "from 23 million people in 1985 to 14.5 million last year"). 
66. AMERICA'S LoNGEST WAR, supra note 10, at 156. 
67. ld. 
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The ideology of the public policy model of decisionmaking is that 
decisionmakers weigh the costs and benefits of human conduct as well as the 
costs and benefits of legally regulating or prohibiting that conduct and do so 
according to the will of the people. The formation of rational public policy is 
really a type of utilitarian decisionmaking procedure that uses legal coercion 
in any way that will maximize some implicit conception of aggregate welfare, 
constrained by the requirement that any such measures be approved by persons 
elected by the voting public. 
Of course, this ideology is based largely on a myth or fiction, for no 
genuinely comprehensive cost-benefit analysis is even attempted, much less 
achieved. In the context of drugs, the public policy approach is usually no 
more sophisticated than the following: For a variety of reasons, using some 
drugs is, on balance, bad both for those who use the drugs and for others 
whom these people affect by their conduct. To prevent these bad consequences 
from occurring, we must apply legal sanctions. Legal sanctions will "send a 
message" of disapproval to those who normally obey the law and deter those 
who would otherwise act illegally. From this, the public policy approach 
concludes that the benefits to be gained by preventing some people from 
getting and using drugs outweigh the costs of such a policy. 
America's Lo'ngest War reveals this analysis to be completely false. The 
book relies on data that are generally available, and in many cases, generally 
known as well-particularly among policymakers. Yet the drug war persists 
and, despite the evidence, will continue to persist for some time because the 
idea of ending drug prohibition is consistently rejected out of hand by almost 
all politicians and law enforcement personnel. The continuation of this tragic 
policy exemplifies the weakness of the public policy model of legal 
decisionmaking. 
Although the shortcomings of the public policy model are multifaceted, the 
model is in all its guises a form of central planning and suffers from all the 
well-known deficiencies of this genre.68 This is true even for so-called 
"decentralized" versions that shift some decisionmaking authority to 
administrative agencies, "independent" government corporations, or states and 
municipalities. In each of its forms, the public policy model requires that the 
world's myriad problems be defined as "social" problems requiring "public" 
solutions. In the case of drugs, for example, individual decisions to use a 
variety of different intoxicating substances, with a variety of different effects, 
in a variety of different ways, for a variety of different reasons, must be 
conceived as a general social problem-the "drug problem"-with enough 
common characteristics that it may be addressed by a "drug policy" consisting 
68. See e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, lNDIVIDUAUSM AND EcONOMIC ORDER 77-78 {1948); see also 
DON LAVOIE, RIVALRY AND CENTRAL PLANNING (1985); D!OMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 
(1980). 
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of general programs and a scheme of rule-governed coercive punishments 
administered by a legal system. This mode of decisionmaking runs afoul of the 
pervasive social problems of knowledge and of interest.69 
The problem of knowledge is the inability of public policy experts to know 
enough about the subject at hand to formulate consistently welfare-enhancing 
public policies. At the extreme, it is impossible for any one mind or group of 
minds to know each of the people who choose to use drugs, their reasons for 
doing so, the effect of drugs upon them and their families, the alternatives 
available to them, their ability to cope with their behavior, and the harm that 
will be inflicted upon them by coercively imposed drug policies. Do we really 
believe, for example, that the prospective "cost" of the murder of Frank Muss a, 
Arthur Salcedo, and his brother Michael was actually incorporated into a 
utilitarian policy calculation that supposedly led to and currently supports drug 
prohibition? 
The gross generalizations and abstractions used by public policy experts 
to elide these factual particulars mask those experts' pervasive ignorance and 
the inherent riskiness of adopting their policy "prescriptions" into law. Do we 
really believe, for example, that the costs imposed on all victims of drug-
related violence have been or even could be incorporated into anyone's public 
policy model of drug prohibition? Moreover, although the model contemplates 
ratification of these prescriptions by popularly elected officials, the electorate 
gets the bulk of its information from the proponents of the policies in question. 
In the case of the War on Drugs, government antidrug propaganda, especially 
in the schools, is an integral part of the war effort. 
Ironically, the problem of knowledge is typically used by adherents to the 
public policy model of decisionmaking as a weapon to advance their agendas. 
The destructiveness of the drug war can now be empirically demonstrated 
because its devastating consequences have already occurred. Before the policy 
was implemented, however, predictions about the adverse effects of prohibition 
would necessarily be far more speculative and abstract. Although one could 
have safely predicted that drug prohibition would lead to more dangerous 
drugs, it was impossible to predict, for example, the invention of "crack" 
cocaine. 
Arrayed against such "speculation" are the ever-confident predictions of 
prohibitionists that legal coercion will eliminate or greatly reduce the use of 
drugs. Such confidence is displayed today, for example, by gun prohibitionists 
who believe that prohibition can "rid the streets" of guns, thereby seriously 
retarding violent crime. Despite our age-old experience to the contrary, such 
predictions are difficult to refute. I raise the issue of gun prohibition here, not 
69. For a brief explanation of these problems and how they are addressed by the liberal conception 
of several property and freedom of contract, see Randy E. Barnett, The Function of Several Property and 
Freedom of Contract, Soc. PHIL. & PoL'Y, Winter 1992, at 62. 
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because I expect all readers to share my skepticism about the efficacy of this 
policy, but because we are in the "ex ante" position with respect to gun 
prohibition that we once were with respect to alcohol and drugs. Ex ante, 
nothing seems more certain to the prohibition-minded than that a legal ban of 
any sort will end or greatly reduce the targeted conduct. While the purported 
benefits of such bans are asserted by their proponents with certitude, the 
predictable harms are dismissed as merely speculative. In the past, the thinking 
goes, we were not tough or smart enough; this time we will do things right. 
To their credit, Duke and Gross see that the current infatuation with gun 
control is as unrealistic as the goal of a "drug-free" society. They also see 
what most today have missed: the underlying increase in violent crime that is 
driving the gun prohibition agenda is related to the War on Drugs: 
[T]he possession and use of guns can no more be prevented by 
prohibition than can the possession and use of drugs. America's 
frenzied return to the murderous ways of the Wild West can be 
reversed only when it becomes irrational to keep or carry a gun for 
self-defense. That will occur when-and not before-predatory crime 
rates take a deep and permanent plunge. The only way that can 
happen in the near future is by decriminalizing drugs.70 
No one who chooses to ignore the obvious criminogenic effects of drug 
prohibition can be entirely serious about the solving the problem of violent 
crime-particularly the violence in the drug-war-tom inner cities. Although this 
is not the place to discuss all the factual disputes raised by proposals to 
prohibit firearms,71 we need not try gun prohibition to predict safely the 
results of such an "experiment." The same principles that explain why drug 
prohibition has been such a disaster apply to gun prohibition as well.72 
Perhaps most importantly, we may also predict that, however destructive it 
may be, once enacted any such experiment is likely to be irreversible. 
Emotions are at work here. Enacting statutes is seen as "doing something" 
about a social problem and is depicted as being morally superior to "doing 
nothing." Legislators who vote for such policies are depicted in the press and 
in popular fiction as caring and courageous (although their courage involves 
imprisoning others at public expense). Those who oppose such policies are 
70. AMERICA'S LoNGEST WAR, supra note 10, at 113. 
71. Were it not beyond the scope of this Review, I might tell stories of the many middle-class African-
American businessmen who have been prosecuted as criminals in "gun court" for carrying handguns for 
their own protection while driving through unsafe neighborhoods. Like drug prohibition, handgun 
restrictions have a disparate impact on minorities. See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The 
Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309 (1991) (describing 
historical impact of gun legislation on minorities and racial motivations behind many early laws in the 
United States). 
72. For a fuller discussion of these principles in the context of drug prohibition, see infra pp. 2620-
2625. 
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considered to be old-fashioned, small-minded, and without imagination. They 
are called "soft on" whatever conduct is being opposed. Most damning of all, 
they are charged with being indifferent to the suffering of others. After all, if 
a legislative initiative does not work out we can always end it. What harm is 
there in trying? 
Plenty. Once enacted, if not before, such policies are subject to the 
problem of interest. This is the tendency of people to act in spite of their 
knowledge or to delude themselves as to the facts in order to serve their own 
good rather than that of the public. Enacted public policy regimes create a 
conflict of interests between persons who directly benefit from the policies and 
those who must bear the costs of the policies. Notable beneficiaries of drug 
prohibition include drug researchers who rely for their funding almost 
exclusively on government grants and, most importantly, the law enforcement 
agencies at all levels of government that receive massive funding for this 
righteous crusade and now enjoy the fruits of asset forfeitures. Politicians too 
benefit by trumpeting a political issue with none of the contentiousness of such 
subjects as abortion or taxes. When politicians cry "get tough on drugs," 
whose vote do they lose? 
These beneficiaries of policies such as prohibition are constantly striving 
to recruit the public to their cause. They are adept at producing evidence 
showing either that current efforts are working or that the widespread failure 
of current efforts demonstrates the need for a massive escalation of funding. 
Whether continued or increased levels of funding are justified because current 
policies have succeeded or because they have failed will vary from expert to 
expert and from day to day. Those who benefit from public policies can 
always be relied upon to produce horror stories to illustrate the necessity of the 
policies in question. They are not above smearing or dismissing 
contemptuously those who oppose them73 and ignoring any expert or official 
73. One example is William Bennett's condescending response to Nobel laureate economist Milton 
Friedman's thoughtful and impassioned plea for drug legalization, Milton Friedman, An Open Letter to Bill 
Bennett, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 1989, at A14. Bennett's reply included the following: 
What surprises me is that you would continue to advocate so unrealistic a proposal without 
pausing to consider seriously its consequences .... In my judgment, and the judgment of every 
serious scholar in this field, the potential costs of legalizing drugs would be so large as to make 
it a public policy disaster .... As for the connection between drugs and crime, your unswerving 
commitment to a legalization solution prevents you from appreciating the complexity of the 
drug market. 
William J. Bennett, A Response to Milton Friedman, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1989, at A30. Bennett 
concludes: · 
A true friend of freedom understands that government has a duty to craft and uphold laws that 
help educate citizens about right and wrong .... 
Today this view is ridiculed by liberal elites and entirely neglected by you. So while I 
cannot doubt the sincerity of your opinion on drug legalization, I find it difficult to respect. The 
moral cost of legalizing drug use is great, but it apparently lies outside the narrow scope of 
libertarian policy prescriptions. 
. . . Your response . . . is to surrender and see what happens. To my mind that is 
irresponsible and reckless public policy. At a time when national intolerance for drug use is 
rapidly increasing, the legalization argument is a political anachronism. Its recent resurgence 
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commission that reaches the "wrong" result. In the world of public policy, 
there is no failed social program that would not work as advertised if only 
massive amounts of new "resources" were made available. The drug war is no 
exception. 
Although the public policy model usually takes a "do something" approach 
to legislation, a concern for the problems of knowledge and interest often leads 
public policy experts to reject the idea of allowing individuals and associations 
to take a similar approach in their own lives. In the case of chemotherapy for 
physical illness, for example, the lack of knowledge of a drug's safety and 
effectiveness coupled with the perception that unscrupulous physicians might 
pursue their self-interest by preying on ignorant consumers have led to heavy 
regulation of prescription drugs, including complete prohibition of certain 
drugs. Individual physicians with knowledge of particular patients and their 
conditions are prohibited from treating disease with any drug that has not been 
proven in advance to be both safe and more effective than a placebo.74 
Public policy experts presumptuously take these life or death decisions out 
of the hands of patients and their physicians, so as to prevent the impulse to 
"do something" about one's terminal illness from causing someone to expend 
money and hope on unproven or risky treatment. This reveals the essentially 
elitist and paternalistic attitudes underlying the public policy model. Public 
policy experts and officials are competent to implement coercive schemes to 
deal with vastly complicated social problems, but ordinary persons are not 
competent to make decisions concerning some of their most personal 
situations. 
Were drug laws subjected to the same scrutiny as prescription drugs, those 
laws would immediately be withdrawn from the marketplace. Such laws cannot 
be shown to be either safe or effective. One may question whether such a risk-
averse standard of proof is defensible in the case of prescription drugs, where 
individual consumers-particularly those with terminal diseases-who have 
personal knowledge of their own suffering and their own alternatives can 
assume the risk of experimental and other unproven treatments. In contrast, 
proponents of drug prohibition are willing to impose their treatment on others 
without any showing of safety or effectiveness and under circumstances in 
which any assumption of risk by those harmed by prohibition is entirely 
fictitious. Persons who are the objects of criminal persecution have in no 
is, I trust, only a temporary distraction from the genuine debate on national drug policy. 
/d. In his reply, Bennett did not address Friedman's central charge that, since Friedman first advocated 
legalization in 1972, drug prohibition has greatly aggravated rather than ameliorated the problem of illicit 
drug abuse. 
74. Since placebos are effective in a minority of cases, drugs that do not exceed a placebo's 
effectiveness may be entirely useless. On the other hand, they may actually be effective in a minority of 
cases. We just do not know. Simply because a drug cannot statistically outperform a placebo does not mean 
that it could not clinically benefit a patient who would be unaided by a placebo. Resolving this uncertainty 
by requiring that drugs outperform a placebo settles the case but does not answer this question. 
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manner freely assumed the risk of drug prohibition. Yet they must suffer the 
consequences nonetheless. 
In sum, the public policy model of decisionmaking errs in the direction of 
enacting laws that rarely if ever can be repealed, regardless of how useless and 
damaging they may turn out to be. Such repeal then only comes after costing 
countless persons their happiness and even their lives. What is the alternative? 
Ensuring that the harmful side effects of legal coercion are incurred only when 
such coercion is both necessary and proper requires not problem-by-problem 
experimentation formulated by public policy experts constrained exclusively 
by electoral politics, but a commitment to what can only be called principle 
and a respect for properly formulated individual rights.75 
Like public policy analysis, principles are generalizations, but they are 
generalizations that have withstood the test of time. Their validity or wisdom 
has been demonstrated by long and varied experience. In contrast to the 
formulation of "social problems" that abstract from the great diversity of 
individual circumstances, these generalizations usually attempt to take those 
circumstances into account. They are bottom-up, rather than top-down.76 Such 
generalizations are by no means perfect guides to conduct. As factual 
generalizations, they do not always yield favorable outcomes even within their 
respective domains, though where possible this typically leads to the 
formulation of general exceptions. Moreover, as products of human 
understanding, such principles may be imperfectly formulated, though they can 
be refined when they are shown to be deficient. Indeed, principles are valuable 
guides to conduct precisely because exceptions have been recognized over time 
and formulations have been refined in light of ongoing experience. 
Still, despite these imperfections, a legal system informed by the right set 
of general principles77 can do a better job than a legal system guided 
exclusively by the public policy modeC8 Although there is no necessary 
reason why legislators may not take principles into account when fashioning 
legislation, experience supported by public choice theory suggests that they 
75. I shall not discuss here the precise relationship between the concept of a right and that of a 
principle. One might characterize a right as one kind of principle; or a right may be seen as justified by 
principles. In the balance of this Review, I mainly use the term "principle,'' rather than "right," though 
much of what I have to say about the former would apply as well to the latter. 
76. Cf. Wallace Matson, Justice: A Funeral Oration, I Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Autumn I983, at 94 
(contrasting natural justice or justice from the "bottom up" with artificial justice or justice from the "top-
down"). 
77. I would be content if those who are skeptical of identifying the "right set" of principles were 
equally skeptical of finding the right set of public policies. 
78. The issue of whether general principles should supplement or entirely replace public policy 
analysis is too difficult to discuss in this Review. Still, even constraining public policy analysis by the right 
set of principles would be a great improvement over the status quo. Elsewhere, in the context of the Ninth 
Amendment, I have proposed the adoption of a judicially enforceable "presumption of liberty" that must 
be overcome before government may forcibly constrain the rights-respecting choices of individuals and 
associations. See Randy E. Barnett, Introduction: Implementing the Ninth Amendment, in 2 THE RIGHTS 
RETAINED BY 1HE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF 1HE NIN1H AMENDMENT I (Randy E. Barnett 
ed., I993). 
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will often give them short shrift. When they do, courts may properly employ 
principles to evaluate and constrain legislation without directly engaging in 
public policy analysis.79 
What does a more principled approach to drug prohibition reveal? Drug 
prohibition involves the punishment of victimless conduct. Such conduct is 
often defined in terms of the "harm principle": people should have the freedom 
to act so long as they do not harm others. Given the inherent subjectivity of 
"harm," however, the concept of victimless conduct cannot be taken to mean 
conduct with no adverse effects on others. As has long been recognized,80 
most conduct has what economists refer to as positive and negative 
externalities. The prohibitionists' argument that drug use is not truly a 
victimless crime because it harms many people other than the user is beside 
the point. Despite the existence of external negative effects, drug use is a 
victimless crime in the sense that it is conduct that does not physically 
interfere with the person or property of another. Prohibiting crimes that are 
victimless in this limited sense invariably leads to the sort of bad results81 
described in my personal anecdotes. There are at least two reasons for this. 
First, such behavior is consensual and therefore all of the persons involved 
will take great pains to avoid detection by the police. In contrast to crimes 
such as rape, ·robbery, or theft, the absence of a complaining witness means 
that the conduct will not naturally be brought to the attention of the police. 82 
Instead, the police must not only find the perpetrator of a victimless offense, 
they must also detect that a crime has been committed. As noted by Duke and 
Gross: 
79. Sometimes when courts employ principles it may appear to some to be engaged in a "crude" or 
"naive" type of policy analysis. Those who make this charge often do not understand or appreciate the 
nature of principles and how they properly constrain policy. 
80. See, e.g., HERBEIIT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 64-65 (Robert Schalkenbach Found. 1970) (1850): 
Some may argue that it is not allowable to assume any essential difference between right 
conduct toward others and right conduct toward self, seeing that what are generally considered 
purely private actions do eventually affect others to such a degree as to render them public 
actions, as witness the collateral effects of drunkenness or suicide. 
In ..• [this allegation] there is much truth, and it is not to be denied that in the final 
analysis all such distinctions as those made above must disappear. But it should be borne in 
mind that similar criticisms may be passed upon all classifications whatever .... The same 
finite power of comprehension which compels us to deal with natural phenomena by separating 
them into groups and studying each group by itself may also compel us to separate those actions 
which place man in direct relationship with his fellows from others which do not so place him, 
although it may be true that such a separation cannot be strictly maintained. 
81. Indeed, John Stuart Mill, the philosopher now most closely associated with the "harm principle" 
was a utilitarian who saw no distinction between the "moral'' and "practical" dimensions of this principle. 
See JOHN SnJARI' MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1861), reprinted in 43 THE GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN 
WORLD 473b (1952) ("The moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another (in which we must never 
forget to include wrongful interference with each other's freedom), are more vital to human well-being than 
any maxims, however important, which only point out the best mode of managing some department of 
human affairs."). 
82. Even though murder victims cannot complain, the crime of murder is investigated when a family 
member, friend, neighbor, or co-worker reports a person as missing, or when there is a discovery of a body. 
The position of coroner was established precisely to account for the death of all discovered bodies. 
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Since drug transactions take place between willing buyers and sellers, 
both of whom are motivated to avoid detection, law enforcement lacks 
its staunchest ally, the victim, who is motivated not only to report the 
crime but to testify against the perpetrator. Drug crimes are therefore 
difficult to ferret out and to prove. 83 
Consequently, the police must adopt entirely different and highly invasive 
means to detect the commission of such crimes. The use of general 
surveillance, random or systematic searches, undercover police, informants, 
electronic eavesdropping, reporting requirements, urine testing, and polygraphs 
are all necessary aspects of detecting victimless crimes, as is the violation of 
constitutional rights. Conspiracy has traditionally been among the most difficult 
crime to detect without creating an enormously powerful police apparatus that 
routinely invades the privacy of the citizenry. Yet every drug transaction is a 
form of conspiracy between buyer and seller. In sum, because of the lack of 
a complaining witness, the criminalization of victimless conduct will inevitably 
require the techniques of a police state. 
The second problem with prohibiting victimless conduct is that buyers are 
willing to pay others to commit the offense. It is highly unusual for one person 
to pay someone to commit an act that physically invades the person or 
property of another. Contract murders are exceedingly rare. A more common 
example of such an arrangement is when a person buys and resells stolen 
goods or automobiles. To compensate the buyer for his risks, the thief who 
sells stolen goods receives a greatly discounted price for the stolen items. In 
contrast, with victimless crimes, the person who sells drugs receives from the 
buyer a greatly increased price to compensate her for the risks inherent in 
supplying the desired good. In this way, whenever there is a widespread 
demand for a good that is artificially in short supply due to a legal prohibition, 
a lucrative black market will develop, providing potentially large monetary 
gains to those persons who are risk-averse enough to supply the good. 
The artificially inflated prices of this black market force buyers to 
somehow find the money to pay for the prohibited good. Many will be unable 
to raise the money by any but criminal means. Many will make money by 
committing victimless crimes such as prostitution or the sale of drugs. Others, 
however, will turn to burglary, theft, and robbery. Ironically, what began as 
victimless conduct is transformed by a legal prohibition into a reason to 
commit crimes that do harm victims. Moreover, to the extent that engaging in 
this conduct is criminal and must be hidden, even those who might pay for 
their behavior with legitimate employment are at constant risk of detection, 
loss of employment, and being forced into the criminal subculture to which 
they have already been exposed by the need to purchase drugs illegally. 
83. AMERICA'S LoNGEST WAR, supra note 10, at 107. 
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The black market also creates an incentive for organized violence. 
Manufacturers and distributors live in constant fear of detection. Their very 
livelihood and freedom depend upon their willingness to punish anyone who 
would expose their conduct. Nor can they resolve any contractual disputes in 
courts of law--even were they the sort of persons who were otherwise 
disposed to do so. Rather, violent self-help is their only recourse. Even greater 
still, the prohibition of consensual victimless conduct contributes to violent 
crime by putting vast sums of money and valuable substances in the hands of 
persons who must deliberately do business outside the auspices of law 
enforcement and who themselves can never complain about their own genuine 
victimization. Consequently, every day persons such as Gregory Perkins who 
buy or sell illicit intoxicants are robbed and murdered for their money or their 
drugs. 
Thus, prohibiting victimless conduct invariably leads to bad results not 
only because that conduct is consensual and there are no complaining 
witnesses, but also because people are willing to pay others a premium to flout 
the law. Moreover, like mixing cocaine with alcohol and barbiturates, the lethal 
interaction of these two features of prohibiting victimless conduct creates a 
vast potential for official corruption. The fact that there are no complaining 
witnesses means that it is solely up to the police to press charges. Should they 
decide not to arrest someone, no witness is likely to object-least of all the 
drug offender. This fact, coupled with the sea of black market money 
generated by prohibition, creates overwhelming opportunities for police to 
receive great wealth simply by looking the other way. Thousands of persons 
who entered law enforcement to do good will succumb to the temptation. 84 
Police integrity is also jeopardized by the constant and irresistible pressure 
to lie about the circumstances of an arrest so as to justify its legality. Integrity 
is like virginity; once lost it can never be reclaimed. Having lied once for a 
"good cause" and with the approval of one's peers and superiors, lying can 
become a way of life for some police officers. At a minimum, most police 
officers must develop a line between lying to preserve a righteous arrest and 
lying to advance their own interest or to convict the innocent. This line is not 
always easy to distinguish or maintain. 
At this point, some may ask whether other goods and services have been 
banned throughout history without such dire consequences. Perhaps, but such 
prohibitions are likely to work only when extra-legal socialization leads people 
to abjure the conduct in question. Under these circumstances, there is no 
substantial market demand for such goods or services and consequently 
84. The magnitude of the corruption effect of prohibition is difficult to establish. That such corruption 
exists, however, is undeniable. I once gave a speech favoring drug legalization to an Illinois law 
enforcement association. Many police officials including chiefs of police were in the audience. Although 
several expressed doubts about legalization, none contradicted my charge that drug prohibition corrupts 
police officers "and you know it." -
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prohibition will not cause a lucrative black market. Nor are highly intrusive 
means required to detect prohibited conduct. Thus prohibition "works" when 
it is largely unnecessary. This is not to deny that laws may influence and 
reinforce extra-legal social sanctions. My claim is that any such reinforcement 
comes at a very high price, and one that is drastically and consistently 
underestimated. 
What about the ability of law to send a message of approval about that 
which is permitted and disapproval about that which is prohibited? The 
message of approval that supposedly attaches to legally permissible conduct is 
an artifact of a misguided conception of law. For people with the totalitarian 
attitude that every type of morally objectionable conduct is potentially subject 
to legal regulation, legality implies approval. 85 In a society that recognized 
the person's freedom to make mistakes or to engage in conduct of which 
others disapprove, however, legality need send no such message. 86 
As for the message sent by criminalization, one is tempted to respond that 
if one wants to send a message, one should call Western Union, not Congress. 
Duke and Gross are among the few I have read who take this issue 
seriously-far more seriously than do ardent prohibitionists: 
Criminalizing behavior that is commonly engaged in by a substantial 
segment of a society inevitably debases the currency of criminal 
proscriptions. If a legal system declares that both drug use and 
robbery are reprehensible, it is not only making a moral statement 
about drug use, it is making a moral statement about robbery.81 
Criminalization is then like antibiotics; neither should be overused. Doing so 
will tend to weaken the effectiveness of both. Moreover, as Duke and Gross 
observe: 
The use of marijuana, cocaine or heroin cannot be the moral 
equivalent of murder while the smoking of tobacco and the drinking 
of liquor are lawful. The hypocrisy is too transparent. Drug 
85. Even the great medieval religious philosopher Thomas Aquinas did not take such a position. 
Replying to the question of "whether it pertains to human law to repress all vices," he offered the following 
argument that strikes one as remarkably modern and even liberal: 
Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of which are not 
perfect in virtue. Therefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, 
but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain, and 
chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human society 
could not be maintained; thus human law prohibits murder, theft and the like. 
THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA, in 20 THE GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 232a 
(1952) (emphasis added). He also argued that attempting to impose "the burdens of those who are already 
virtuous" on "the multitude of imperfect men" would cause "these imperfect ones, being unable to bear 
such precepts, [to] ... break out into yet greater evils." !d. 
86. However, as discussed in Part V, replacing drug prohibition with government dispensation of 
intoxicants would run afoul of this difficulty. 
87. AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR, supra note 10, at 106 (emphasis added). 
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prohibition undermines rather than strengthens our morals and our 
fidelity to criminal law. 88 
This, in a nutshell, is the principled analysis that enables us to predict that 
prohibition is likely to lead to disastrous consequences without having to try 
it. In fact, the only time that prohibition appears to work is when it is not 
needed. A principled analysis does not disregard the relevant facts in favor of 
"simplistic" solutions to complicated problems. To the contrary, it takes the 
complexity of the human social condition far more seriously than so-called 
"sophisticated" public policy analysts, who see in legal prohibition of any 
undesirable behavior the simplest of solutions to complex human problems: 
Don't like something? Ban it. 
Given the critical tenor of my remarks to this point, I should hasten to 
emphasize that there is nothing inherently objectionable about a public policy 
analysis; some of my best friends do public policy analysis. Principles alone 
do not make us expert about any social problem; that requires the sort of 
information that good public policy analysis and some experience on the 
ground can provide. Duke and Gross' public policy analysis, for example, 
teaches us much we might not otherwise have known about the consequences 
of the current regime of drug prohibition. What is objectionable is enacting 
laws sanctioning the punishment of persons solely on the basis of such 
analysis-what I have called here the "public policy model of legal 
decisionmaking"-unconstrained by the sort of principled analysis just 
outlined. Principles remind us of the inherent limits of using legal coercion and 
enable us to predict with a fair degree of confidence that a legal scheme that 
looks attractive from a public policy standpoint is likely both to lead to 
damaging unforeseen results and to be difficult to reverse if that should 
occur.89 
V. ALTERNATIVES TO PROHIBITION 
A commitment to principle was once considered a virtue. This attitude was 
a product of a more humble view of human knowledge and interest, as well 
as human power, than obtains today. The dominance of the public policy 
model of legal decisionmaking has undercut this sentiment by promising clean 
solutions to intractable problems. Persons of principle are now commonly 
condemned-especially by academics-as "doctrinaire" or "ideologues." Even 
Duke and Gross succumb at one juncture to this sort of rhetoric. When 
considering the appropriate form of legalization they assert that: 
88. /d. 
89. Analogously, to understand the past, sound principles are no substitute for historical research. But 
historical research unguided by sound principles is likely to be seriously deficient. 
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Few but the most doctrinaire libertarians would favor ... [the 
unfettered distribution of drugs], which threatens to replicate one of 
the worst problems that we now have with the largely unregulated 
distribution of cigarettes. Children would have easy access to drugs. 
. . . [T]he unfettered option also would possess many of the 
disadvantages of the present regime, in which the consumer has no 
protection against mislabeled drugs or products tainted by toxic 
adulterants. There is nothing wrong with-and much to be gained 
by-drug regulation short of prohibition.90 
Of course, following the prescriptions of "doctrinaire libertarians" would have 
avoided the very harms that Duke and Gross spend several hundred pages 
discussing. Listening to the importuning of "reasonable regulators" got us into 
this mess and, despite the publication of this book, seems at the moment 
unable to extricate us from it. For years only "doctrinaire libertarians" had the 
courage to oppose drug prohibition. Only just recently have the consequences 
of this policy spread so far and so wide that even law professors at respectable 
universities and other mainstream folks have seen the error of their prior, but 
of course never doctrinaire, beliefs. Moreover, there is nothing libertarian about 
fraud ("mislabeled drugs") and negligence ("toxic adulterants"), much less 
selling dangerous goods of any kind to children-depending of course on 
where the uncertain line between childhood and adulthood is drawn. 
Nonetheless, even the most doctrinaire of libertarians would have to 
concede that adopting a regulatory regime short of complete prohibition would 
avoid many of the most egregious costs now impelling all but the most 
doctrinaire of statists towards the unthinkable: complete legalization. This is 
why the thousands of persons who now suffer at the hands of the current 
regime of prescription drug regulation will have to wait for nondoctrinaire 
"pragmatic" policy analysts to get around to reforming that system. That is, if 
they live that long. Their numbers are just too few to create either adequate 
political pressure of the sort that AIDS activists have recently brought to 
bear,91 or the sort of black market that inflicts sufficient damage on society 
as a whole to get its attention. For this reason, at the moment, few but the 
most doctrinaire of libertarians would argue for greatly increasing the legal 
rights of patients to assume the risk of unproven treatments now banned in this 
country. And, at the present rate, soon only the most doctrinaire of libertarians 
will be defending the rights of "pornographers" to publish and citizens to buy 
erotic literature. 
Apart from this rhetorical lapse, Duke and Gross offer some sensible 
suggestions about the appropriate form of legalization. For example, they reject 
90. AMERICA'S LoNGESf WAR, supra note 10, at 264. 
91. By this analogy I mean only to suggest the type of political pressure that cancer victims and others 
have been unable to muster. I do not mean to suggest that the political pressure generated by AIDS activists 
is solely a function of their numbers. The story is far more complicated than this. 
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the homble but surprisingly common proposal that illicit drugs be distributed 
by a government monopoly: 
[W]hen government is the sole legal distributor of a COIIliilOdity, 
competition and self-interest are not available to promote the efficient 
workings of the market. ... The temptation of government to increase 
profits by raising prices on a controversial product would also 
exacerbate the problems. Black markets that legalization was designed 
to prevent would develop parallel to the government drug-distribution 
system, just as illegal gambling organizations compete with state-run 
lotteries. 
Finally, when the government has a financial interest in promoting 
vice, as it does in those states that have lotteries, states frequently 
engage in shameless promotions, even fraud, to induce their citizens 
to part with their money.92 
One must also add to this the difficulty of projecting an attitude of societal 
disapproval when government is not only permitting, but also facilitating a 
type of potentially harmful conduct. The charge, which I criticized above, that 
legalization would connote societal approval, would seem a legitimate 
objection to government provision of intoxicants. 
Duke and Gross recommend a system of licensing in which "[n]o 
monopolies or oligopolies should be created. Any person or organization 
meeting minimum requirements should get a license."93 They suggest that a 
.commercial licensing system should also include mandatory warning 
labels, generic packaging (no brand names, slogans or touting) and 
detailed description of contents and purities. It might also be advisable 
to limit the quantities of drugs that any individual could purchase, to 
require records of sales, and to forbid quantity-price discounts.94 
They even go so far as to propose that the FDA should "approve drugs 
developed to provide intoxication, as well as those having 'medical' value. 
This would provide substantial incentives to the pharmaceutical companies to 
develop safer and less addictive pleasure drugs than most of those now on the 
market."95 While there is no doubt that such a system would largely end the 
scourge caused by prohibition and would be a much welcome development, it 
is not without its difficulties. 
Some of these difficulties attach to all licensing regimes. Typically these 
measures increase the costs of products, thereby imposing some increased 
burdens on the poor, though hopefully not enough to recreate the vicious black 
92. AMERICA'S LoNGEST WAR, supra note 10, at 265. 
93. ld. at 266. 
94. ld. 
95. ld. at 268. 
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market. Few if any "pure" licensing regimes have ever failed to be converted 
into sources of government revenue or barriers to competition or both. After 
all, the government claims the monopoly on licenses and so it tends to extort 
a monopoly rent. This rent is often disguised by budget "deficits" deliberately 
created by inflating "costs"-usually by sweetheart agreements with politically 
favored groups, who may in turn pass a portion of the money back in the form 
of campaign contributions. Licensing schemes are also subject to capture by 
regulated enterprises in such a manner as to penalize competitors, especially 
potential competitors. Other problems follow from the licensing of socially 
stigmatized behavior. Thus the price of cigarettes and alcohol can be greatly 
inflated by so-called "sin taxes," particularly if it is a minority that imbibes. 
It is no coincidence that taxes and other restrictions on tobacco smoking have 
increased as consumption has declined. 
Moreover, record keeping makes invasions of privacy inevitable. Imagine 
an official record-keeping requirement imposed upon video stores. The demand 
for Robert Bark's rental records shocked even some of his opponents. Keeping 
records of drug users would certainly drive many into the anonymity of a black 
market, particularly if the social stigma attached to drug use is increased to 
compensate for the absence of legal constraints.96 All of this, though perhaps 
not inevitable, is predictable with confidence by those who understand the 
principles at issue. 
Ultimately, this and other issues now dealt with by the public policy model 
require a more "doctrinaire" approach-if what this means is not unthinking 
or knee-jerk reactions, but instead a commitment to general principles and 
especially to the individual's right to control his or her own body as he or she 
sees fit. Once more to their credit, Duke and Gross devote a chapter to the 
"autonomy costs" of prohibition, in which they summarize the "fairly 
conventional libertarian objections [to drug prohibition] that transcend time, 
place and society. Their persuasiveness does not depend upon the particular 
characteristics of a culture.'>97 Such objections are based on the "right to 
choose which drugs to use, and whether to use them at all, [which] is arguably 
as fundamental as the right to decide where to live, where to work, whether 
to marry, whether to have children, how much education to seek and how to 
raise one's children."98 They consider seriously the argument that the 
judgment of adults about the value to them of imbibing intoxicants deserves 
more trust than the judgment of the state.99 They also consider the argument 
96. One of the reasons that British regulation of heroin addicts, though preferable to our policies, has 
failed to end the black market there (and its associated crime) is the unwillingness of many addicts to 
submit to the record keeping and cost of seeking heroin from physicians as "treatment" for their "illness." 
97. AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR, supra note 10, at 154. 
98. ld. at 152. 
99. ld. at 152-53. 
1994] Bad Trip 2629 
that decisions about the use of psychoactive drugs are an important part of life 
and of the development of individual potential.100 
[T]he truth is that drugs provide great pleasures to many, including 
many who are not in any sense addicted. Those who feel that they are 
more creative or insightful or self-aware while under the influence of 
psychedelics or other drugs may be delusional or they may be right. 
Prohibitionists commonly assume that such claimants are delusional, 
but proof of that assumption is entirely absent. It is riskier to a society 
in the long run to prohibit access to drugs which have that potential 
than it is to permit such access.101 
This almost sounds like the invocation of a principle. 
CONCLUSION 
Although America's Longest War provides a breath of fresh air, Duke and 
Gross overlook-and in this they are in good company-the connection 
between so-called doctrinaire "libertarian" objections and the harmful "social" 
costs of drug prohibition they expose. A regime of rights that places the 
freedom and responsibility for making decisions of fundamental importance on 
those individuals and associations who must bear the major cost of choice is 
the liberal solution to the problems of knowledge and interest discussed 
above.102 Such a regime also addresses the pervasive problem of power.103 
Considerations commonly characterized by nonlibertarians as "libertarian" 
focus on the harms directly caused to those persons who are the objects of 
legal coercion. By contrast, analysis stressing the harmful consequences 
inflicted upon the society at large are considered to be "utilitarian." But if the 
foregoing analysis of drug prohibition reveals nothing else, it is that the rights 
that are needed to protect individual and associational freedom can be justified 
as necessary to avoid both kinds of harmful consequences.104 Attempting to 
100. Id. at 153-54. 
101. Id. at 154. 
102. See Barnett, supra note 69; supra text accompanying notes 69-74. 
103. See Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Can Justice and the Rule of Law Be Reconciled?, 11 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 597, 619-22 (1988) (describing problem of power as a special exacerbated form of the 
problems of knowledge and interest). 
104. Cf. Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Of Chickens and Eggs-The Compatibility of Moral Rights and 
Consequentialist Analyses, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 611 (1989). There I distinguish between moral 
rights analysis, which "views the actions of individuals and associations from the perspective of the 
individual and the association," id. at 617, from consequentialist analysis, which "takes seriously the wide-
reaching and highly dispersed effects that the actions of individuals and associations may often have on 
others," id. at 618. Although I defend both modes of analysis, one argument I offer in favor of the former 
is 
its ability to obviate the need for costly and potentialJy tragic "social experiments" that may be 
recommended by faulty consequentialist analyses. Even when such experiments are destructive, 
there is often no efficient way to terminate them. It is far better to use a moral rights analysis 
to look before one leaps. 
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achieve either individual or general welfare by ignoring these rights will 
invariably lead to human suffering that is as avoidable and undesirable as it is 
unforeseen by those who choose to rely upon a public policy model to decide 
matters of legality. 
!d. at 620; see also Randy E. Barnett, The Virtues of Redundancy in Legal Thought, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 
153 (1990) (extolling virtues of using multiple modes of analysis in reaching conclusions about legality). 
